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CONTRACT IS CONTEXT
Peter A. Alces*
INTRODUCTION
Actually, Contract is context. We can only understand the
normative object of Contract by reference to the context in which the
doctrine operates. That is a challenge for unitary normative
theory-a challenge that more than a few theorists have been
willing to confront on their way to positing unitary normative
theories of Contract.! Such efforts are largely empty. Contract is, in
an important sense, the product of a series of historical accidents
because history is context in retrospect.2 But there is a method to
the madness: while Contract represents diverse (and often
divergent) normative conclusions, those conclusions do proceed from
the conjunction of a limited store of normative alternatives. My
thesis is that context reveals the normative dynamic that
determines the incidents of the law of consensual relations-
Contract-and doctrine accommodates that revelation. That
statement will support more specific consideration of the normative
challenge that the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts
("Software Principles"), recently promulgated by the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), present to Contract law and to Contract theory
* Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary
School of Law. I am indebted to my research assistants Robert Friedman,
Benjamin Wengerd, Bradley Mainguy, Patrick Taylor, and Lily McManus for
their assistance in the preparation of this Article. I am also grateful to Bob
Hillman for helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors are the fault of the
author alone. The analysis and argument of this Article is derived from my
forthcoming monograph, THE EMPIRICAL MORALITY OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE
(Oxford University Press, 2011).
1. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAw (1981); CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489
(1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (2001).
2. See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the
Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 875 (2007) (observing
that if no unifying theory of contract law exists, or the unifying theory is
undiscoverable, then "contract doctrine represents little more than the random
final product of a long chain of historical accidents").
903
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
more generally.
Part I of this Article offers general observations concerning the
function and operation of theory in law generally, and Contract
specifically. I argue that we may be skeptical of unitary normative
theory in Contract without being indifferent to the proliferation of
rules that treat normatively consistent contexts inconsistently. The
presumption should be that like contexts support like results; there
must be good reason for divergent results in normatively
indistinguishable contexts. That is not to say that we need a single
unitary normative foundation of Contract, but rather that resolution
of recurring controversies should draw consistently from the same
normative sources. Contract may be neither wholly deontological
nor wholly consequentialist, but we should expect that similar
issues in normatively similar contexts should be resolved by
reference to the same or a similar amalgamation of normative
premises. Indeed, I am sure that this is all Contract doctrine
promises, and, indeed, this is all Contract doctrine can promise.
Part II of the Article considers very specifically the contract
formation rules of the new Software Principles. When we try to
come to terms with them from the perspective developed in Part I of
the Article, what conclusion can we reach, or should we reach, about
the contribution the Software Principles make to the Contract law
generally? I fear that one of the Reporters, Professor Hillman-also
a contributor to this Symposium-may too modestly present what he
and the ALI have accomplished.' This Part reacts to Professor
Hillman's understanding of the fit between the Software Principles
and normative theory of Contract. He and I generally agree, but we
disagree around the edges. There is, though, significance in our
disagreement to the law of Contract as it will inevitably continue to
evolve.
Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to establish some
premises.
The stock (and correct) response to recurring Contract questions
is "it depends." If A and B agree that they will do X, does A have a
cause of action if B does not perform as agreed? It depends. Not
only would we need to know the subject matter of the parties'
undertaking but we would need to know what the agreement entails.
Further, we would need to know something about A and B. And we
would also need to know what X is. The doctrine may be sensitive to
those variables; there are rules and exceptions and exceptions to
exceptions that account for the circumstances in which A does have
a cause of action and the circumstances in which A does not have a
cause of action. Just as often (indeed, likely, more often), however,
doctrine is not expressly sensitive to context. It is the nature of the
3. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS intro. (2010).
4. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of
Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (2010).
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relationship between the transactional context and the operation of
the apposite doctrine that will be determinative.!
5. Relatedly, resolving the question of whether common law Contract
informed the development of transactional categories (context) may be difficult.
An example of this question is whether we understood sales contracts as
significantly distinct from marriage contracts before we realized they were both
creatures of "contract." Professor Grant Gilmore asserted that the categories
preceded the generalized theory: "[Wie have tended to assume that 'Contract'
came first, and then, in time, the various specialties-negotiable instruments,
sales, insurance and so on-split off from the main trunk. The truth seems to
be the other way around." GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12 (1974).
Professor James Gordley was not convinced that the categories preceded
the theory. See James R. Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARv. L. REV. 452, 453
(1975) (reviewing GILMORE, supra). The resolution of that historical question,
though, is of only historical interest. What matters for present purposes is the
substance of the category-theory relationship. That is, even if the categories
did precede the theory, as Gilmore maintained, does that tell us anything
important about the category-theory relationship? Conversely, if the theory
preceded the categories does that have normative significance? History can
explain why we might reach an erroneous normative conclusion, but it cannot
confirm that some other normative conclusion is correct. Homicide is
punishable as a crime today, and should be, whether or not we could
understand its rudiments as springing from evolutionary patterns developed
when homo sapiens were not grouped in the social units that now determine
human interaction. The best that history can do for us is trace the source of our
normative conclusions-which might have been mistaken. History cannot
justify a normative conclusion; it can neither establish nor, alone, undermine
the normative significance of categories.
So Gilmore's arguments matter even if his history is less than certain:
"Once the theory had been announced it did operate, by a sort of backlash effect,
to influence further development in some of the specialties . . . ." GILMORE,
supra, at 13. "Backlash effect" or not, there is something intuitive about
appreciating symbiosis between theory and category, perhaps akin to a
"reflective equilibrium." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971):
In searching for the most favored description of this situation we work
from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it represents
generally shared and preferably weak conditions. We then see if these
conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles. If
not, we look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and
these principles match our considered convictions of justice, then so
far well and good. But presumably there will be discrepancies. In this
case we have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial
situation or we can revise our existing judgments, for even the
judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision.
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a
description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable
conditions and yields principles which match our considered
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as
reflective equilibrium.
Even if the categories did evolve before the theory that would reconcile
them, theory would have already been at work to fill the interstices between the
doctrine within each category. So, although we may appreciate A, B, and C as
separate (and distinguishable) transactional categories, rules Al, A2, and A3
20101 905
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Although Contract doctrine will not support a unified theory of
promise enforcement in the familiar deontological and
consequentialist categories, it may support a comprehensive theory
of the interrelation of normative values that operate in Contract
contexts.' Succinctly, the structure may be described in generic
terms: if results A and B are not consistent at one level of theoretical
inquiry, that alone will not preclude their consistency at another,
more fundamental level. What is determinative is our perspective,
our level of acuity. A structure too coarsely grained to be intelligible
from one perspective may be completely intelligible from another,
after we, say, pull back the camera just enough.' If we consider
normative theories A and B as potentially apposite in a context and
find a result consistent with A but not B, that does not mean that A
but not B is the unified theory. It may be the case that C, a
nonnormative theory, operates and, in so doing, vindicates a
principle more fundamental than either A or B, which principle we
could appreciate, after all, as mere means rather than object. C may
explain why, in the particular context, the normative conclusion of A
takes precedence over B (and why in the next context the order of A
and B might be reversed, or their combination modified). To
elaborate: consequentialism needs to serve some instrumental object
and even deontology needs some reason (perhaps found within us) to
vindicate duty; Kant, after all, had his reasons. So if we can
discover the dynamic that explains the relationship among the
extant theoretical perspectives and the objects of Contract (the
goal(s) of those normative perspectives), then we may have
discovered all that theoretical inquiry can make available to us. It
is context that reveals that relationship.
The foregoing suggests the centrality of context in Contract, so
far as normative theory is concerned. In order to reach reliable
conclusions about the normative bases of Contract, it is necessary to
understand what distinguishes the characterization of one
transactional context from the next." Then the challenge is to
would only be coherent if we could understand them as consistent elaborations
of some fundamental normative object at the base of A; there would be an effort,
self-conscious or not, to identify the normative basis of A. Because the available
normative alternatives are not that numerous-writ large they are deontology
and consequentialism-it should not surprise us to find that, ultimately, even
the most disparate normative constructions share fundamental affinities. It
would be surprising if a category as large as Contract did not reveal some
coincidence among its transactional constituents.
6. This raises the question, "what are Contract (as opposed to Tort,
Property, or other legal) contexts?" That important inquiry is beyond the scope
of this Article.
7. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN
THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX 29 (1994) ("[Wjhen defining complexity it is
always necessary to specify a level of detail up to which the system is described,
with finer details being ignored. Physicists call that 'coarse graining.'").
8. It should come as no surprise that some aspects of transactions have
[Vol. 45906
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determine the significance of that characterization in terms of the
relationship between context and the normative inquiry.
I. THE OBJECT OF THEORY
The expansive field of Contract neither easily lends itself to
rationalization based on a single positive, normative, or interpretive
theoretical perspective, nor is such a system obviously desirable. At
the same time, it is not obvious that it would be undesirable that all
consensual relations subject to legal regulation proceed from a
unitary theoretical foundation. But the test of a theory is its ability
to explain and predict, so we should not be surprised (or alarmed) to
find that theory (like the best tool) needs to conform to the task.
The first challenge, then, must be to discern the nature and
roles of theory. That project is metatheoretical: what is it we
understand the theoretical inquiry to be, and does it reduce to a
single object? From there, we may reach some conclusion about the
fit of a particular theory-positive, normative, or interpretive-with
the law we have. But whether that conclusion would hold up when
compared with the substance of Contract, the doctrine, is an
important question, the answer to which we must not assume. An
adjunct of my thesis is that a key to understanding Contract is
understanding why it cannot be contained by any one of the
aformentioned theories as commentators have thus far constructed
them. But by that I do not mean to suggest that Contract is
atheoretical; it most certainly is theoretical.
All theorizing, Contract theorizing not excepted, proceeds from
a conception of morality and assumes a junction between theory and
morality and then between that morality and the object of inquiry.
Though I shall argue that it is unnecessary to do so, all extant
theories of Contract in fact assume a moral foundation and discover
that foundation in either consequentialist or nonconsequentialist (or
deontological) premises. "Consequentialism" here denotes a moral
theory that judges actions and decisions by analysis of their
consequences and nothing else.9 Deontology, on the other hand,
judges the morality of decision-making with no reference to its
consequences. As explained by Immanuel Kant, certain normative
imperatives, such as the categorical "act only according to those
maxims that can be consistently willed as a universal law," 0 exist
outside of consequentialism. The autonomy facilitated by such
imperatives is indispensible to nonconsequentialist conceptions of
more in common, in normative terms, with Tort (nonconsensual liability) than
with other aspects of Contract. See generally Andrew Robertson, On the
Distinction Between Contract and Tort, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS:
CONNECTIONS AND BOuNDARIEs 87 (Andrew Robertson ed., 2004).
9. BRIAN Bix, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 40 (2004).
10. Karl Ameriks, Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), in THE CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 460, 465 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
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promising and, by extension, Contract." It should be noted that
while the nonconsequentialist category here certainly includes
deontological theories, the two terms are not synonymous.
The search for a single Contract theory, though, need not
necessarily be limited to normative conclusions. Indeed, in the case
of Contract, a nonnormative or mechanical theory may well be able
to do a better job of what we want or need theory to do if we
abandon the quest for a unitary normative explanation and
justification. When normativity, as constructed from a
consequentialist or deontological perspective, does not exist, such a
mechanical theory would be the only workable option. Once we do a
better job of coming to terms with the morality of human agents, we
may find somewhat less than at first meets the eye.
The success of normative theory as a tool for Contract and other
human institutions requires a link between the human agent and
normative theorizing. Philosophy has endeavored to discover the
normative dimensions of human agency. Rational choice theory is
an attractive assumption for consequentialists, providing a clear
connection between actions and their desired consequences. It also
allows leeway for judgmental errors, assuming that markets will
correct mistakes in the long-term by absorbing new information on
which to base decisions. This theory, and its assumption of markets'
ultimate infallibility or trustworthiness, has met recent criticism in
the form of research that supports the opposing behavioral decision
theory.12 Deontology has also struggled with the human agency
issue. While Kantian theory, for example, may possess comfortingly
consistent logic, it ultimately does not adequately explain either the
normativity of typical human agents or the doctrine itself.
Theory certainly provides obvious advantages in the realm of
decision-making and problem-solving. Human actors generally base
their reactions to stimuli on heuristic devices. Experience-based
cues allow actors to recognize acquaintances from afar, or decide
whether to carry an umbrella. The ability to act relatively quickly
using heuristics with a high probability of reaching the desired
outcome is preferable to waiting for complete information; though
more information might reduce the margin of error, the cost in loss
of action, or paralysis, would be prohibitively high.
The use of theory follows this heuristic reasoning; the more
accurately a theory predicts outcomes, the more human agents will
deem its margin of error acceptably small. ' Indeed we have no
11. Id.
12. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739
(2000) (discussing behavioral decision theory and the law).
13. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY
OF JUDGMENT § 2.3 (1987) ("[Gliven the inherent imperfection of any physical
device, we know that it will not perform perfectly."); Peter A. Alces, Contract
Reconceived, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 39, 83-84 (2001); Peter A. Alces, On Discovering
[Vol. 45908
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choice but to rely upon heuristics, and no less theories, that work
well enough often enough.
There is a necessary attraction to heuristics in their provision of
intellectual leverage. They enable us to do things we could not do
without them. Not least of which, they support learning, teaching,
and argument. We rely upon particular heuristics, including our
own theories that work best for us, that provide the greatest
leverage. And we guard them and promote them zealously. If they
work for us they must work for others, or perhaps we have deluded
ourselves into believing that they do work as well as we think they
do. Whatever explains our commitment to our theories, it is clear
that we develop such commitments and enlist them to support
argument.
There is danger in losing sight of that propensity to theorize
and the necessary limitations of heuristics. So long as our heuristics
do not obscure the reality with which we would have them deal, so
long as they do, in fact, provide reliable leverage, they are useful.
But the danger remains that we will be captivated by the leverage,
by the very idea of such leverage. The intellectual power of
heuristics is alluring; we could not do without it. We can too,
though, be misled by the siren song and make mistakes. We will err
if we settle on the wrong heuristic or, as bad, assume that we can
rely on a heuristic when there is not one available. Plausible stories
that can be made to fit the evidence do not provide real leverage,
even though they might seem to. They facilitate error. So, in our
search for parsimony, we must remain true to Einstein's
admonition: theory should be as simple as possible, but no simpler.14
Contract theory, specifically a unitary normative theory, has so
far failed because it has so far failed to provide a useful heuristic.
The theories may make a normative argument (what Contract
should be); they just fail to account for (interpret convincingly) the
stuff of Contract, the doctrine. You might wish that your heuristics
did not fail you and that the red Ferrari in the parking lot were
yours; but if all you hold is title to a red Civic, all you hold is title to
a red Civic, and your heuristics have failed you, even if both cars are
red and have four tires. You will appreciate the danger of relying on
faulty heuristics when you are arrested for grand theft.
The problem with developing and then relying on faulty
heuristics (unitary normative theory) in Contract law may be less
dramatic but is no less problematic. If you assert that Contract
means X and then it turns out to mean Y, you will have erred not
just in your understanding of what Contract has done but also in
your projection of what Contract can and should do. Theory
Doctrine: "Justice" in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 505-07, 512
(2005).
14. See Albert Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical Physics, 1 PHIL. Sc.
163, 165 (1934).
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provides (or good theory would provide) both an explanation and a
justification. Professor Jody Kraus understands the difference
between consequentialist and what he terms "deontic" theories to lie
in their different shadings between explanation and justification:
The fundamental difference between deontic and economic
contract theories is not that one is exclusively normative and
the other exclusively explanatory. ... [Tihe crucial second-
order disagreement between deontic and economic theories is
over the relative priority between explanation and
justification, as well as the contest between stated doctrine
and case outcomes as sources of law. ... The primary goal of
deontic theories is to demonstrate that contract law is a
morally and politically legitimate institution, rather than to
explain how contract law determines outcomes in particular
cases. In contrast, economic theories are principally concerned
to explain how contract law determines outcomes in particular
cases. Both kinds of theorists acknowledge the importance of
both justification and explanation. But deontic theorists are
methodologically committed to understanding the justificatory
task first, and explaining particular cases later, while
economic theorists are methodologically committed to
undertaking the explanatory task first, and justifying the
existence of contract later.'6
Whether or not Kraus's dichotomy is convincing, insofar as he fixes
the tension between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
theory in terms of their respective explanatory and justificatory
aspirations, he appreciates the nature of the heuristic leverage that
theory endeavors to provide.
A certain theory, whether it be consequentialist or not, that
illuminates a systemic pattern in Contract beyond what has been
discoverable by the doctrine, would provide intellectual leverage
both in its predictive (positive) and determinative (normative)
abilities as applied to the doctrine. By incorrectly attributing such
qualities to a theory, we run the risk of reaching ineffective
conclusions by emphasizing the possibilities of Contract over
Contract in fact. If, for example, a consequentialist theory supports
the conclusion that Contract damages formulae result in efficient
breach, but the actual doctrine does not, the conclusion loses its
interpretive credibility and becomes a mere normative judgment.
Theoretical constructions may fail in several ways, and a critique
that could demonstrate the particular failures of one construction or
another would make a valuable, though limited, contribution. The
critic, though, could (and usually does) offer an alternative theory-
15. See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 687, 694 (Jules Coleman
& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
16. Id. at 696.
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one that both reveals the limitations of what preceded and develops
an edifice that supports the weight prior efforts failed to support.
But, after some time, cynicism becomes attractive. That is, when
theoretical constructions built upon a strict
consequentialist/nonconsequentialist dichotomy fail-on both
explanatory and justificatory bases-you begin to suspect that they
are making a common mistake. What both consequentialist and
nonconsequentialist theories share is a focus on the human agent
and a human artifact: Contract doctrine and its elaboration in
litigated controversies. So in deciding which approach can claim the
most intellectual leverage, it is necessary to fix the metric. While
the human agent may be idealized at least at the outset, at some
point if that idealization undermines the ability of theory to explain
or justify, the terms of that idealization must be relaxed.
An important argument here is that the disjunction between
theories' conception of human agency and the human agent in fact
undermines any claim that extant theories may make to intellectual
leverage. A more authentic conception of the human actor and the
human actor's engagement with Contract doctrine demonstrates
how unitary theory fails. We are, in an important way, contracting
animals, and our Contract law, the doctrine, its application, and
operation, may well be, to a significant extent, the product of that
Contract sense. While it should not surprise us that Contract
doctrine, a human artifact, would reflect the unique way in which
human agents confront bargaining contexts, there may not be a
basis to assume substantial coincidence between the agent and the
artifact. At the same time, though, it would not be surprising were
there more coincidence than has been appreciated by
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories that are
insufficiently considerate of the characteristics of human agents.
Human agents are neither consistently consequentialist nor
consistently deontological." The pull of both predispositions results
in a "fairness" calculus that relies more on emotional reaction than
rational deliberation, or deductive or inductive inference from
immutable principles. While space limitations preclude elaboration
on that observation, the analysis of doctrine that follows assumes
that premise. So if you do not accept the premise, you may not
accept my conclusions about the Software Principles' efficacy as
Contract doctrine. But for now, for the sake of argument, assume
that normatively we are the product of a persistent tension between
the consequential and the deontological and doctrine modulates that
tension.
17. See JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL
BEHAVIOR 39-51 (2002) (concluding that Stanley Milgram's shock and obedience
experiments reveal subjects' situational morality).
20101 911
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II. THEORY AND THE SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES
It is on a conception of human agents' normativity that I
support my conclusions regarding when the Software Principles'
succeed as Contract doctrine and when they do not. The Software
Principles, as part of Contract, work best when they fit with our
most authentic conception of the human agent best. And they fit
best when they accommodate and modulate the consequentialist-
deontological tension.
Professor Hillman recognizes that the Software Principles are
not isolated from Contract writ large. If the Software Principles are
to matter most, indeed, if they do matter (and I think they do), then
they must be part of Contract and change our way of thinking about
what Contract does and can do. They make a normative statement
in their particular accommodation (combination) of consequentialist
and deontological premises. While we may be able to distinguish
the context in which the Software Principles would operate from
other contexts in which Contract principles also operate, that fact
does not necessarily diminish the Software Principles' impact on
Contract. And once the ALI approved the Software Principles, the
ALI was making a normative statement about the law of Contract
and not just the law governing software transactions. That must be
the case, unless there are good reasons to conclude otherwise.
To make this part of the argument more concrete, I focus on two
aspects of the Software Principles' treatment of the agreement rules,
a response to Contract law as the Software Principles found it. In
the first example, the Software Principles' extrinsic evidence rule, I
conclude the Software Principles better facilitate the normative
calculus Contract doctrine vindicates than they do in the second
example, the provision concerning so-called "form contracts."
A. The "New" Doctrine
Consider first the section of the Software Principles that would
provide a parol evidence rule to govern software contracts
irrespective of the relative sophistication of the contracting parties:
(e) Unambiguous terms set forth in a fully integrated record
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or
of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be explained by
evidence of a course of performance, course of dealing, or usage
of trade.
(f Unambiguous terms set forth in a partially integrated
record may not be contradicted by evidence of prior or
contemporaneous oral conflicting terms, but may be explained
by evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, usage
of trade, or consistent additional terms."'
18. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SorWARE CONTRACTS § 3.08(e)-(f) (2010).
912 [Vol. 45
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The apposite comment explains that the Software Principles' parol
evidence rule is based "in part" on Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") section 2-202 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts
sections 209, 213, and 214.9 Note particularly the Software
Principles' use of the terms "unambiguous," "integrated,"
"contradicted," and "explained." They resonate with human agents'
efforts to resolve the consequentialist-deontological tension.
The parol evidence rule can serve, as well as frustrate,
transactor expectations and contracting objectives.20 To
oversimplify, if the parties to a transaction reduce their
understanding to an integrated writing,2 1 that writing" may not be
contradicted by extrinsic evidence2 3 prior to or contemporaneous
with the writing. The rule enables the parties to preserve the terms
of their agreement: neither can go behind the writing to adjust the
allocation of risks fixed by the writing. That works well enough to
reduce transaction costs and thereby promote efficiency so long as
neither party's justified expectations are undermined by the rule.
But it could be the case that one party understood that something
said to her by the other prior to execution of the writing would be
enforceable. For example, during negotiations, Seller tells Buyer
that Seller will repair or replace any component of the primary good
19. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209,
213-214 (1981).
20. The common law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts contain differing but essentially similar renditions of the
parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Shultz v. Delta-Rail Corp., 508 N.E.2d 1143, 1150
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("An agreement reduced to writing must be presumed to
speak the intention of the parties who signed it. The intention with which it
was executed must be determined from the language used, and such an
agreement is not to be changed by extrinsic evidence."); 67 Wall St. Co. v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 333 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 1975) (recognizing that the
parol evidence rule in New York "requires the exclusion of evidence of
conversations, negotiations and agreements made prior to or contemporaneous
with the execution of a written lease which may tend to vary or contradict its
terms"); U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213
(1981).
21. An integrated contract is defined as "[olne or more writings constituting
a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 880 (9th ed. 2009). Note that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
expressly refers to an integrated agreement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 213 (1981), while the U.C.C. implicitly refers to it, using the
following language: "a record intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein." U.C.C.
§ 2-202 (2005).
22. "Writing" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (2005) as including
"printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."
Article 1 also defines "Record" as "information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(31) (2005).
23. Because the rule extends to all extrinsic evidence, oral or written, it is
strictly speaking not just a rule about "parol" evidence.
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that fails within thirty days of buyer's receipt of the good. Seller
then presents Buyer with a writing to, be signed that contains an
integration clause and the writing says nothing about repair or
replacement of defective parts. When a crucial part fails, Buyer
requests repair or replacement and the seller refuses, citing the "as
24is" language in the writing.
Some courts have not been favorably disposed toward ignoring
extrinsic evidence that would reveal the parties' intent more
accurately than would the purportedly integrated writing.25 At the
same time, though, the good sense of the rule would be compromised
were a sophisticated buyer, who understood that the writing took
away what the oral representation seemed to give her, able to
undermine the parties' written agreement by introducing evidence
she knew she had surrendered (for a price, certainly) the right to
introduce. Similarly, the equities would rarely seem to lie on the
side of the party who gives with one hand (orally) and then tries to
rely on what may be fine print to take that away with the other.
Indeed, that might explain both impatience with the rule's operation
and with the structure of the rule in its statutory and Restatement
(Second) iterations. The exceptions to the rule are significant.26
Next, consider the Software Principles' provision on form
agreements. Section 2.02 of the Software Principles is captioned
"Standard-Form Transfers of Generally Available Software;
Enforcement of the Standard Form" and bears reproduction at
length here:
(a) This Section applies to standard-form transfers of
generally available software ....
(b) A transferee adopts a standard form as a contract when a
reasonable transferor would believe the transferee intends to
be bound to the form.
(c) A transferee will be deemed to have adopted a standard
form as a contract if
24. On the sufficiency of an "as is" provision as a disclaimer of implied
warranties, see U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (2005).
25. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
442 P.2d 641, 646 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the lower "court erroneously refused
to consider extrinsic evidence offered to show that the indemnity clause in the
contract was not intended to cover injuries to plaintiffs property" when
defendant's performance of contract with plaintiff to replace the upper metal
cover of a steam engine resulted in damage to plaintiffs property); Masterson v.
Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence in a bankruptcy proceeding that a nonassignable option to
repurchase a home was intended to keep the home in the possession of the
family).
26. See E. ALLAN FARNSwORTH, 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.4 (3d ed.
2004).
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(1) the standard form is reasonably accessible
electronically prior to initiation of the transfer at issue;
(2) upon initiating the transfer, the transferee has
reasonable notice of and access to the standard form
before payment or, if there is no payment, before
completion of the transfer;
(3) in the case of an electronic transfer of software, the
transferee signifies agreement at the end of or adjacent to
the electronic standard form, or in the case of a standard
form printed on or attached to packaged software or
separately wrapped from the software, the transferee does
not exercise the opportunity to return the software
unopened within a reasonable time after the transfer; and
(4) the transferee can store and reproduce a standard
form if presented electronically.
(d) Subject to § 1.10 (public policy), § 1.11 (unconscionability),
and other invalidating defenses supplied by these Principles or
outside law, a standard term is enforceable if reasonably
comprehensible.
(e) If the transferee asserts that it did not adopt a standard
form as a contract under subsection (b) or asserts a failure of
the transferor to comply with subsection (c) or (d), the
transferor has the burden of production and persuasion on the
issue of compliance with the subsections.
The section provides an alternative "fall back," of sorts: "failure to
comply does not absolutely bar a transferor from otherwise proving
transferee assent."28 The apposite comments explain that the
provision would apply to all transferees whether business (large or
small) or consumer: "[DIrawing lines between what constitutes a
large or small business or between businesses in the same position
as consumers and businesses with a better bargaining position
would be difficult and largely arbitrary."29
The drafters of the Software Principles seem to suggest that the
object is deontological: "Increasing the opportunity to read supports
autonomy reasons for enforcing software standard forms. . . ."'o It
is not, though, so clear that the provision relies on deontological
rather than consequentialist premises. The focus is not on the
particular transferee, but is instead on whether the standard term is
reasonably comprehensible. Such a term will apparently bind the
transferee even in the absence of actual agreement. The form
27. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2010).
28. Id. § 2.02 cmt. c.
29. Id.
30. Id. ch. 2, topic 2, summary overview.
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agreement provision does not modulate the consequentialist-
deontological tension; it represents a clash of the two normative
perspectives and so fails where the Software Principles' parol
evidence rule succeeds.
B. Software Principles' Agreement Doctrine in Theoretical Context
A challenge that should remain for the ALI will be to offer
convincing arguments to distinguish the software contracting
setting from other transactional contexts.' In his contribution to
this Symposium, Professor Hillman presents his appreciation of the
larger jurisprudential issue the Software Principles reveal.3 2 He
argues that specialization, deference to context, is important
because generalization, de-emphasis of context, comes at a cost.
That is not to say that all Contract rules should be particularized;
there is a tension between the costs and benefits of generalization
and specialization that must be resolved by reference to values that
inform the role of Law more generally. Hillman takes stock of those
costs and benefits.
1. Costs of Generalization
First, focus on two of the costs of generalization with regard to
aspects of the agreement calculus.
a. "Abstract Principles Cannot Predict Outcomes Coherently."3i
Hillman argues that vague principles of the general Contract law
would leave undetermined important questions that relate to
software.3 So the Software Principles need to fix clear rules that
determine those important questions. As examples, he offers the
consideration issue in open source software, 3  automated
disablement, the implied warranty of no hidden material defects of
which the transferor is aware, and, of particular interest here,
31. See Memorandum from Micalyn S. Harris to Reporters, Director,
Advisors, Consultative Group Members, and Members of the Institute (May 16,
2008) (on file with author) (arguing, in response to the Comments on Discussion
Draft of March 24, 2008, that the ALI has not demonstrated "why general
contract principles are or should be inapplicable to contracts involving
software"); Memorandum from Bob Hillman & Maureen O'Rourke to Director,
Advisors, Consultative Group Members, and interested members of the ALI
(Sept. 2, 2008) (on file with author) (responding to Harris's memorandum,
supra).
32. See generally Hillman, supra note 4.
33. See id. at 678-86.
34. See id. at 678.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 678-79.
37. Id. at 679-80.
38. Id. at 680-81. See generally Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The
B(1)oorn of Products Liability Theory in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87
CAL. L. REV. 269 (1999) (discussing the inefficacy of software warranties).
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contract interpretation." We must first put the issue in theoretical
context.
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott proceed from
consequentialist premises and minimize the importance of the parol
evidence rule by identifying firms as the prototypical parties in
40Contract and then evaluating firms' priorities. 0 Because a
dichotomy exists between individuals and firms as contracting
parties in terms of their respective concerns and interests, according
to Schwartz and Scott, there should be a parallel dichotomy in the
doctrine that addresses parties' contextual interests. Schwartz and
Scott assert that, as a repeat player holding a portfolio of
contractual agreements, a firm has a somewhat different attitude
towards risk than does the typical individual. Their argument is
that this difference is reflected in different transactional contexts
and justifies divergent applications of the parol evidence rule. On
this view, firms would find their interests served by "courts get[ting]
things right on average" 42 with minimum evidentiary input. For
these repeat players, the cost of minimizing the margin of error
would be greater than the losses accrued when the courts get it
wrong. This conclusion depends on the assumption that firms, by
allocating risk over an array of investments, are able to achieve risk
neutrality, minimizing their concern for losses over any one contract
in their portfolio.43 So firms, according to Schwartz and Scott, would
prefer strict limitations on the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Whether or not Schwartz and Scott present an accurate
characterization of firms' attitudes towards risk, distinguishing
between firms and individuals makes a significant point about
context within the doctrine. Discrepancies in courts' application of
the parol evidence rule could be a response to the nature of a certain
type of party and its relation to risk; apparently inconsistent
constructions of the rule by reference to transactors' interests could
in fact vindicate consistent normative objectives. Schwartz and
Scott have thus produced a plausible explanation for apparent
inconsistent applications of doctrine."
Professor Daniel Markovits responds that Schwartz and Scott
are missing something central to Contract, such as autonomy,
bilateralism, and collaboration between the parties, and so do not
appreciate why the parol evidence rule ought to be construed in a
39. Hillman, supra note 4, at 682-83.
40. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 590-91(2003).
41. Id. at 556 (asserting that because business entities are "artificial
persons," the state need not enforce their commercial contracts based on
principles of autonomy and morality).
42. Id. at 577.
43. See id. at 576.
44. See Peter A. Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1647, 1666-70 (2007).
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way that would accommodate the introduction of more extrinsic
evidence. Such contracts among firms, Markovits contends, are "not
in the end agreements at all,"" and are therefore irrelevant to the
doctrine. While Schwartz and Scott focus on economic efficiency,
Markovits uses concepts of collaboration46 and agreement to build a
deontological framework.
Schwartz and Scott differ fundamentally from Markovits in
their choice of the type of transaction that is most in need of
doctrinal attention. Since individual transactors doing business
with organizations are generally guided and protected by statutory
law, such as consumer protection law,47 Schwartz and Scott
designate transactions between organizations, or firms, as most
relevant to Contract law. 4' The alternative perspective proposed by
Markovits, is that "contracts among individual, natural
persons . . . represent the core of contract."49  Ultimately, both
perspectives are fatally incomplete. A unifying theory of contract by
definition needs to address the totality of Contract.o
The colloquoy, while considerate of the respective transactional
contexts confronted by firms on the one hand and individuals on the
other, does not offer a bridge between the contexts that would
support more fundamental unifying theory. Of particular concern
here, we may have learned nothing that would certainly inform a
parol evidence rule in the software contracting context.
We may, though, discover something more fundamental in the
way human agents makes normative judgments. The Software
Principles get this right. The Software Principles' parol evidence
rules draws on U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) antecedents to
develop a formulation that can respond to the concerns of both
Schwartz and Scott and Markovits." A court applying the Software
Principles' rule would not have to do violence to the rule's
formulation in order to accommodate the inevitable normative
calculus, which depends on the consequentialist-deontological
tension. By not fixing the inquiry in either consequentialist or
deontological terms, the analysis is not constrained in a way that
would undermine human agents' normative perspective. So the
provision fits well with existing Contract doctrine and works,
according to the argument of this Article.
45. Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 VA. L. REv. 1325,
1350 (2006) (citation omitted).
46. Daniel Markovits, Contracts and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417,
1420 (2004).
47. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 40, at 544.
48. Id.
49. Markovits, supra note 46, at 1421.
50. See Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in
the General Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
51. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS ch. 3, topic 2,
summary overview (2010).
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b. "Undesirable Outcomes of General Law."52 Hillman argues
that specialized doctrine, doctrine that is context specific, can
respond to deficiencies in the general Contract doctrine.53 It is in
this section that he makes the case for the Software Principles'
treatment of standard form contracts." The Software Principles
rely largely on disclosure. The Software Principles' form agreement
provision," represents a departure from the traditional agreement
conception and seems to defer to the type of market forces
consequentialists trust, while affording somewhat less attention to
the concerns raised by deontologists.
The Software Principles' form contract formation rules come
along at just the right (or at least at a particularly interesting) time.
The operation of form contracts has received considerable attention
over the last few years.
A challenge for courts confronted with the contract formation
questions is to determine how to construe the "agreement"
requirement." Is it necessary that the parties actually be aware of
and understand the legal consequences of their communications
(and even such awareness may be a matter of degree), or may the
law infer sufficient agreement to support the imposition of liability?
Courts that take seriously awareness and understanding can better
explain their conclusions by reference to deontological precepts: for
example, we vindicate individual autonomy by respecting the actor's
choice to assume a legal duty. Courts concerned with finding only
sufficient agreement may be more concerned with the utility of
imposing the legal duty than with any particular transactor's
appreciation of the legal obligation that follows therefrom. Three
cases that reach opposing conclusions illustrate that divide-two
going one way, one the other-on essentially similar facts. The two
cases decided by Judge Frank Easterbrook of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit-ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg"' and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 5 9-and a decision by
Judge Kathryn Vratil of the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas-Kocek v. Gateway, Inc.co-each construe
52. Hillman, supra note 4 at 684-86.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2010).
56. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good
Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 879 (2008) (examining the effects of form
contracts on bank customer agreements and the role contract doctrine does or
should play in policing those terms); Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMoRY
L.J. 1511 (2007) (discussing the importance of Contract doctrine and the
implications of twenty-first century contract law on present and future Contract
law).
57. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.01(a) (2010).
58. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
59. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
60. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
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agreement in the same important contemporary context: so-called
"form contracting."6 1  The courts' divergent conclusions may be
manifestations of divergent understandings of the normative claims
made by the apposite Contract doctrine.
i. The Decisions in Doctrinal and Transactional Context. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[an agreement is a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.
A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a
promise for a performance or to exchange performances."" The
U.C.C.'s conception is essentially the same. "Agreement" is first
defined in Article 1 of the U.C.C.: "'Agreement'.. . means the
bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred
from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade .. . ." The pertinent official comment
makes clear that "[wjhether an agreement has legal consequences is
determined by applicable provisions of the U.C.C. and, to the extent
provided in section 1-103, by the law of contracts."" There is
nothing in the U.C.C. concept of "agreement" that is substantially
distinct from general common law contract conceptions of
agreement. "Bargain" works as well in the common law as it does in
the Code.65  But "bargain" seems ambiguous: is a "bargain" the
product of bargaining? Or is "bargain" a term of art that describes
the legal conclusion that an exchange of communications has legal
consequences? While "bargain" in the legal conclusion sense would
be circular, that may not be disqualifying; indeed, that may actually
better describe our understanding of the legal significance of the
term "bargain." We often (perhaps too often) seem to be able to find
sufficient bargain even without real bargaining to support the
imposition of significant contract liability.66
There are two provisions of Part 2 of Article 2 of the U.C.C. that
are particularly relevant to our discussion of agreement as it relates
to the three cases considered here: sections 2-204, "Formation in
General,"6  and 2-207, "Additional Terms in Acceptance or
Confirmation,"" the so-called "battle of the forms" provision. The
stated purpose of both sections is to facilitate contract formation and
to effectuate the parties' intent. 69
Although it is questionable whether ProCD is actually an
61. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-49; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-51; Klocek, 104
F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39, 1341.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
63. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2005) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 1-102 cmt. 3.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 cmts. a, c (1981).
66. See generally Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 56.
67. See U.C.C. § 2-204.
68. See id. § 2-207.
69. See id. §§ 2-204 cmts. 1 & 3, 2-207 cmt. 3.
920 [Vol. 45
CONTRACT IS CONTEXT
Article 2 case,o Judge Easterbrook used Article 2 provisions to
support his conclusions." The issue was whether buyers of
consumer software are bound by the terms of shrinkwrap licenses.n
Zeidenberg had acquired ProCD's software and used it in a manner
inconsistent with the license terms.7 ProCD sought to limit
Zeidenberg's uses of the software to those allowed in the terms of
the license agreement, but Zeidenberg argued that he was not so
constrained because those terms were only presented to him after he
had paid for the software and left the store.74
Judge Easterbrook had no trouble finding a consequentialist
reason for incorporating into the contract the terms of the license
provision limiting Zeidenberg's use of the software: the provision
prevented Zeidenberg from licensing the software at a consumer
price, but exploiting the product for commercial purposes.7 5 ProCD
had to rely on a limitation of use provision included within the box
containing the software in order to effect the desired price
discrimination. 76  Further, Judge Easterbrook observed that
"[tiransactions in which the exchange of money precedes the
communication of detailed terms are common,""7 and he gave several
examples of recurring transactions in which that practice is
followed.
Judge Easterbrook relied mainly on Section 2-204(1). He then
concluded (erroneously) that section 2-207 was irrelevant because
there was only one form in issue and he construed 2-207 to be solely
79
a battle of the forms provision.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. was another Judge Easterbrook
opinion. The Hills called the Gateway phone sales department and
ordered a Gateway computer, agreeing to such things as computer
model, time of delivery, and price.o When the computer arrived at
the Hills' residence, the box contained terms in addition to those
70. The applicability of Article 2 to computer software has attracted a good
deal of attention. See generally PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE
COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 251-64 (1994) (surveying the
cases and commentary).
71. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 1448.
73. Id. at 1450.
74. The terms appeared both in the box and on the monitor screen when
the software opened, requiring acceptance before the user proceed with the
program. Id. at 1452.
75. See id. at 1450.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1451.
78. See id. at 1451-52 (including the purchase of insurance, an airline
ticket, a concert ticket, a product packaged with its warranty, and software over
the phone or on the Internet).
79. Id.
80. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
2010] 921
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
discussed on the phone.8' Among those additional terms was a
requirement that the Hills submit any dispute with Gateway to
arbitration as well as a requirement that the Hills return the
computer to Gateway within 30 days if they did not agree to any of
the additional terms.82 Judge Easterbrook did not rely on the
U.C.C., though the case was obviously within the scope of Article 2:
the sale of the computer to the Hills was the sale of a good.
Judge Easterbrook concluded that the Hills were bound to the
later supplied terms by assuming that later supplied terms could
become part of an agreement after the fact. While there is a way for
that to happen under Article 2, as a section 2-209 modification,
Easterbrook made no such argument, and probably could not have
identified the agreement necessary to support a modification in any
event. Judge Easterbrook concluded that as "master of the offer,"
Gateway could impose its terms on the Hills.
In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc," district court Judge Vratil had to
decide a case with essentially the same facts as those in Hill: sale of
a computer over the phone with terms that follow. Judge Vratil took
issue with Judge Easterbrook's conclusion that the vendor, here
Gateway, was "master of the offer": "The Seventh Circuit provided
no explanation for its conclusion that 'the vendor is the master of
the offer.' In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the
offeror, and the vendor is the offeree."' Even if the Hills were
calling in response to a Gateway advertisement, it is generally
accepted that advertisements are not offers, but rather solicitations
of offers." As a matter of basic contract formation doctrine, Judge
Vratil probably has it right. Under subsection 2-207(1) Gateway's
"expression of acceptance," in response to the Klocek offer, could not
constitute a counter offer (thereby making Gateway the offeror)
because Gateway had not "made its acceptance conditional on
plaintiffs assent to the additional or different terms.... [TIhe mere
fact that Gateway shipped the goods with the terms attached did not
communicate to plaintiff any unwillingness to proceed without
plaintiffs agreement to the Standard Terms." Gateway was
unable to demonstrate that Klocek had actually agreed to their
arbitration provision, and Vratil found that plaintiffs retention of
the computer for five days after receiving it could not constitute
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Kan. 2000).
84. Id. at 1340.
85. Advertisements prevalently are characterized as solicitations of offers
rather than offers. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 26, § 3.10. But see generally
Jay M. Feinman & Stephen R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer? Why It Is
and Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2006) (arguing that advertisements
are offers).
86. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-41 (citations omitted).
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such agreement.
ProCD, Hill, and Klocek challenge us to understand the
divergent normative bases of agreement that inform the different
conclusions of Judges Easterbrook and Vratil. For Judge
Easterbrook, the question of agreement is to be decided almost
completely based on a consequentialist perspective: form contracts
help reduce transactions costs, therefore any conception of
agreement that would undermine such use of standard forms would
be inefficient. "Agreement," then, means no more than it can mean
in order to reduce transactions costs, and any conception of
"agreement" that would increase transactions costs is disfavored.
For Judge Vratil, on the other hand, the question of agreement
operates independent of consequentialist considerations; agreement
must be more like real understanding. Judge Vratil's focus on the
buyer as the "master of the offer" is reminiscent of autonomy
considerations based on deontological values. Gateway could not
impose terms on Klocek that were not part of his offer because that
would violate the buyer's autonomy by undermining the object of his
promise.
Although Judge Vratil's analysis seems more correct as a
matter of law, Judge Easterbrook implicitly asks a question to which
neither Judge Vratil nor doctrine responds: Why should we care
about contracting formalities if attending to them would cost more
than ignoring or relaxing them would benefit transactors?
ii. The Instrumentalism of Agreement. Recently, scholars
have attempted to explain the consumer form contracting context,"
especially with regard to credit card "agreements."89
Consequentialist commentators who consider agreement issues in
the credit card context are in fact furthering Easterbrook's ProCD
and Hill analysis. Easterbrook's decisions raise a question as to
whether we can be assured that a formal agreement conception
consistently increases welfare compared to a substantial agreement
conception.
Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Richard Epstein have debated the
efficacy of deferring to formal agreement.o Bar-Gill, relying on
behavioral economics, argues that we need to do more research
before we can have any confidence that formal agreement results in
87. Id. at 1341.
88. See generally BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS
(Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
89. See, e.g., Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 56, at 1512; Oren Bar-Gill,
Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 33, 48-50 (2006);
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1380-1411 (2004).
90. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts,
92 MINN. L. REv. 749, 749-50; Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics
of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 803, 808 (2008).
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welfare gains.9' Epstein concludes that we can rely on what is
essentially an agency theory to overcome Bar-Gill's reservations.92
It is worthwhile to consider each of their arguments.
Bar-Gill is concerned that credit card issuers exploit less-
sophisticated consumers: "sellers might prefer not to correct
consumer mistakes and might even invest in creating
misperception."93  Bar-Gill does not trust the market to overcome
these "individual irrationalities," and he is certainly correct not to.
Epstein responds to Bar-Gill's examples of ostensible card
issuer overreaching by suggesting an alternative construction that
identifies a market justification for the result." Epstein goes on to
plot the average number of mistakes people make on a curve against
their age,96 confirming, he argues, that people really do learn from
experience. He stretches this data to conclude that "education on
how loans work is often the best protection against various kinds of
dangerous credit practices."9 Epstein makes a very large logical
leap from the assertion that people learn over time to the conclusion
that card issuer's exploitation of consumers is efficient. This logical
leap seems to leave room for precisely the type of empirical evidence
Bar-Gill seeks. Education is obviously some protection against
sharp practices (which might explain why credit card issuers would
change the rules in order to frustrate education),99 but how can we
be sure that it is the most efficient protection?
2. The Normative Significance of Not Knowing What Is Good
for You
Professor Eyal Zamir has argued that paternalism and
efficiency may be compatible. 99 Zamir's analysis supports Bar-Gill's
desire for careful empirical inquiry, the results of which may or may
91. See Bar-Gill, supra note 90, at 749-52.
92. See Epstein, supra note 90, at 832-35.
93. Bar-Gill, supra note 90, at 761. Bar-Gil also asserts that, "[slince
sellers will only alter the design of their products and prices in response to
robust, systematic mistakes, observing such product and price adjustments is
powerful evidence of persistent consumer mistakes." Id. at 766.
94. Id. at 755 n.27.
95. See Epstein, supra note 90, at 821-28.
96. Id. at 812 ("controlling for income, education, creditworthiness, and
other observable variables").
97. Id.
98. See Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 56, at 1527 ("Form drafters can
use a kind of 'three card Monty' game to assure maintenance of the pool of
naive: Each time consumers discover a particularly egregious term, hide the
risk-shifting card by reshuffling the deck or by sleight of hand."); see also
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT
CARD MARKETS 132 (2006) ("It is typical for major issuers to amend their
agreements in important respects with remarkable frequency.").
99. Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 230
(1998).
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not support arguments such as those offered by Epstein:
Arguably, economic analysis does not rest on the normative
claim that rational preferences are a superior criterion for
human well-being than actual ones. It merely rests on the
empirical claim that people's actual preferences are rational.
However, to the extent that standard economic analysis is
built on the assumption that people are rational maximizers,
its normative implications are the same as those of a rational
preferences theory of well-being.
.. . Once the prevalence of systematic deviations from the
rational-maximizer model is acknowledged, principled anti-
paternalism is no longer a tenable position of economic
analysis.
Paternalism can certainly be efficient once it is
realized that normative economics is in fact much closer to an
ideal (rational) preferences theory.100
The analysis that Zamir suggests to determine the efficacy of
paternalismlo would respond to Bar-Gill's difference with Epstein:
"a market-by-market analysis of the costs and benefits [of
regulation]." 210 We do not necessarily need to conclude that Bar-Gill
and Zamir are right and Epstein wrong in order to establish the
incompleteness of a pure consequentialist theory of Contract
doctrine. We simply need to acknowledge that central doctrinal
contract topics such as agreement lend themselves to the type of
inquiry that Bar-Gill and Zamir suggest.
In the course of his defense of the Software Principles' form
agreement provision, Hillman acknowledges that disclosure has its
critics, but opines that "other solutions to the problem seem even
more problematic."10' But for present purposes, focus on the fact
that the Software Principles deviate from the agreement calculus in
the general common law of Contract. Chris Byrne and I have noted
this elsewhere and Hillman cites our concern as marginal support
for his observation that "[s]ome writers seem bothered by the fact
that the ALI Principles' solutions to problems may have resonance
in other forums."o4
It is important here to be very clear. Byrne and I are not so
much bothered by the fact that the "ALI Principles'
100. Id. at 251-54.
101. Id. at 242-46, 251-54 (examining second order preferences, norm
theory, and bounded rationality against ideal (rational) preferences theory).
102. Bar-Gill, supra note 90, at 753-54.
103. See Hillman, supra note 90, at 685.
104. Id. (citing Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is It Time for the Restatement
of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 195 (2009)).
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solutions ... may have resonance in other forums. ,0o On the
contrary, we are encouraged, even enthusiastic that the good sense
of the Software Principles may resonate beyond their explicit scope.
We see no more reason for form contracts to be any more enforceable
outside of the software context than they are within the software
context; indeed, we would not be troubled were they generally even
less enforceable than they would be within the software context.
The crucial point, though, is that there must be good reason for the
discontinuity. It is not enough that the context is distinguishable; it
must be normatively distinct. If the context is normatively
indistinguishable, then efforts to draw lines will undermine the
normative integrity of Contract. It is one thing to say that no single
normative perspective explains all of Contract; it is quite another to
say that Contract is normatively incoherent, and that is precisely
what we say when we draw lines on the basis of political expediency.
It is curious that the law would draw a distinction between
software contracts and other types of sales contracts so far as
agreement and autonomy are concerned. It would seem that we
would be as interested in transactor autonomy when someone
purchases a computer as we are when that same person purchases
or licenses the software that would be loaded on that computer.106
The comments suggest an answer: "Technology may have rendered
ProCD's approval of terms after payment obsolete because the
decision was based in part on the difficulty of providing notice of and
access to a standard form. Today pre-transaction disclosure on the
Internet is not difficult or expensive."1 0 7 Though it is not at all clear
how important the "difficulty of providing notice of and access to a
standard form" was to the decision in ProCD, it would seem entirely
conjectural that pre-transaction posting of terms on the Internet
could do much more for individual autonomy than the "terms in the
box" practice approved in ProCD.
Indeed, and this is the crucial point, if posting on the Internet
could so dramatically affect the autonomy calculus in software
contracting, there is no obvious reason it should not have the same
effect on all commercial contracting. What is normatively
distinctive about the software contracting context? If the answer is
"nothing" (and I suspect it is), then the Software Principles are
much more significant than even the Reporter and the ALI may
acknowledge.108 The Software Principles are an attempt to vitalize
disclosures as a response to autonomy concerns in the formation of
agreements. But there may be no more reason to believe they will
prove efficacious in the software setting than they have in other on
105. See id.
106. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SoFrwARE CoNTRAcTs § 1.06 (2010).
107. Id. § 2.02 reporters' notes, cmt. b.
108. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 673-74.
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settings.
The ALI should be able to answer the question that the
Software Principles pose: why are software form contracts different
from form contracts in other Contract contexts? Hillman seems to
offer an answer-they are not:
[LIawmakers could apply the disclosure approaches adopted by
the ALI Principles to any subject matter of exchange, not just
software. In fact, nothing should stop courts or legislatures
from applying helpful sections of the ALI Principles to other
subject matters and even from including them in a future
Restatement (Third) of Contracts. '0
In the meantime, though, the ALI is the sponsor of conflicting
statements on the Contract law, and that is good for neither the ALI
nor for Contract.
3. Benefits of Generalization
Finally, following his review of the costs of generalization,
Hillman appreciates too the "benefits of general contract law.""
These would be arguments the Software Principles would need to
overcome in order to support their disparate treatment of
fundamental Contract conceptions. Two of the benefits merit
consideration here.
a. Insulation from Interest Groups.2"' Hillman acknowledges
that it would be difficult for special interest groups to capture
specialized reform initiatives because if the revision of doctrine were
more general, the special interest arguing for one resolution of an
issue would be opposed by a constituency that would endorse and
lobby perhaps strenuously for the opposite resolution.xx1 Such
capture was avoided, according to Hillman, for two apparently
opposite reasons: first, there was broad representation of diverse
interests in the drafting process; and second, the groups affected
were aware that the ALI Principles were, well, only "principles,"
and, as such, would not have the force of law that would a model
statute or perhaps even the cachet that a new Restatement of
Contracts would have. 114
It would seem that interest groups did not capture the Software
Principles, or at least there is no obvious evidence that the most
powerful did. But in a very real way, to the extent that we are
109. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 cmt. h
(2010).
110. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 685.
111. See id. at 686-92.
112. See id. at 686-87.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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convinced by the argument that software is different and so requires
different rules, the project does reflect the perspective of a particular
interest group-those concerned with software contracts-and may
not have taken sufficient account of the forces that operate in other
Contract settings to balance the deontic and consequentialist
constituents of Contract doctrine. A particular perspective may
"capture" a project even if that capture is not reflected in one group's
overreaching. The product may suffer if the perspective of those
interested in the transactional context is myopic, if the drafters do
not sufficiently take into account the normative premises (plural)
that inform consensual relations generally. While drafters might
find it liberating to draft from whole cloth, there is a cost: normative
concerns that seem inconsequential given the current state of the
transactional setting may emerge when the context has more closely
approximated repose. The Software Principles could be better if
they could anticipate the directions in which the law might develop,
and the history of the Contract law's development offers an
important guide to its likely future development. This is related to
the second benefit of general Contract law that Hillman
acknowledges.
b. "Laboratories of Democracy" Facilitate Resolution of
Collective Problems."' When new transactional forms are subjected
to a more narrow body of principles, they may not evolve as robustly
as they might were they subject to more broadly based doctrine. To
the extent that Contract stakes out comprehensively the normative
tensions and resolution of those tensions in consensual relations
generally, principles that respond to discrete problems may not
encourage transactors and courts to take account of all of the
normative implications of their choices. All doctrine constrains but
the more particular the doctrinal focus the more likely it is that
important considerations will be ignored, or at least obscured.
Hillman responds to this concern by pointing out that the ALI
Principles are, for the most part, default rules, and so transactors
are free to draft around them. He recognizes, though, that the ALI
Principles more specifically regulate software transactions than
would general Contract law." 6 The question, he acknowledges, is at
least in part one of timing. And he cites an article I wrote more
than a decade ago which argued that software contracting had not
yet attained the type of repose that would be necessary for
comprehensive legislation." 7 A good deal has happened to software
contracting (indeed, to all of Contract) in the last decade and it may
be that we have achieved something close to repose; unfortunately
we cannot know that until some time in the future.
115. Id. at 687-88.
116. Id. at 687.
117. Id. at 688 n.88 (citing Alces, supra note 38, at 271-72).
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What we can know right now, though, is that the Principles
diverge from general Contract doctrine in important ways, and that
the Principles do not come to terms with that divergence. There is
just no good reason for there to be different formation rules in
software and nonsoftware contexts: "agreement" is "agreement" and
it is no less crucial when the subject matter of the contract is or is
not computer software. The Principles make new (and, on the
whole, I believe better) Contract law. Professor Hillman is to be
applauded not faulted for the important jurisprudential statement
that the Software Principles make. The ALI should, though,
acknowledge what he and the Associate Reporter" and the
Advisors 9 have wrought.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the nature of normative theory in
Contract and its dependence on context, including the human agent
as an element of context. I have recognized the intellectual and
rhetorical leverage theory provides, and then took notice too of the
dangers of normative theory, either consequentialist or
deontological, that is inconsiderate of context or human agency.
To make more concrete the observations offered here, I have
considered two specific provisions of the recently promulgated
Software Principles. I have placed both provisions in their
theoretical as well as transactional context. My conclusion is that
the parol evidence provision works better because it fits with the
general Contract doctrine and so facilitates sensitivity to context.
The form agreement provision is less successful because it is not
consistent with extant Contract doctrine and does not sufficiently
accommodate context. Both provisions, though, are important steps
in the development of the Contract law and we should recognize
their significance and the significance of the Reporter's work.
Professor Hillman has, nonetheless, improved Contract law, and set
the bar quite high for future development.
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Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law. PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS V (2010).
119. A full list of the project's advisors can be found in the publication. Id.
2010] 929
